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in and for Salt Lake County, Utah
Honorable Christine M. Durham, Judge
Honorable David K. Winder, Judge
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and Respondents

BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
Roy G. Haslam and
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Case No. 17096

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

* * * * * * * ***
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs-Respondents recorded liens against property of
Defendant-Appellant to recover for the cost of material and services
which they provided for Hungry Hawaiian, Inc., a sublessee from Green

Acres of America, Inc., Cross Claim Defendant and Respondent herein.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court for Salt Lake County, Judge David K.
Winder, held that the necessary relationship to entitle Plaintiffs to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a lien grew out of the lease, sublease and letter of acceptance
involved in this case.

Judge Winder failed to rule on the Cross

Complaint of Defendant-Appellant, Navalco of Utah, against Cross
Claim Defendant and Respondent, Green Acres of America, Inc.

Upon

Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment to so provide, Judge Christine M. Durham denied the Motion and
in addition, also denied Appellant's Motion for New Trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant seeks to have the decisions of the
District Court reversed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant-Appellant, Navalco of Utah, entered into a lease
agreement under date of January 24, 1975 in which the subject property was leased to Defendant, Green Acres of America, Inc. (Exhibit
2-P).

The lease required certain construction which was duly

accomplished.

Thereafter, on or about the 17th day of January,

1978, Green Acres of America, Inc. subleased a portion of the subject
premises to Hungry Hawaiian, Inc. for use as a restaurant.
agreement is Exhibit 3-P in the record.

This

Green Acres of America, Inc.

submitted a letter, dated January 17, 1978, to Navalco of Utah
ing permission to enter into the sublease (Exhibit 16-P).
Utah responded as follows:
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')_

request~

Navalco of

"Accepted this 31st day of January, 1978 on the
condition that on ten days written demand after any
default in the lease between Green Acres of America,
Inc. and Navalco of Utah will assign to Navalco the
sublease and, further this condition and acceptance
shall not vary any provision or condition of the
lease between Green Acres of America, Inc. and Navalco.
(Underlining ours)
Thereafter, Hungry Hawaiian, Inc. proceeded to engage various
persons to apply materials to the premises (e.g. Exhibit 2-P), but
thereafter found itself unable to pay all the amounts due.

Liens

were timely filed against the premises by Plaintiffs-Respondents,
Interiors Contracting, Inc. and Action Fire Sprinkler Company, and
by

Defendants and Cross Claimants, Herbert Bergmann, Economy

Builder's Supply, Inc., John Darrell Tohara, Lawrence Lincoln,
Terrance Tohara and Lynn H. Gray dba Gray's Electric (Exhibit 1-P).
Action was brought by the Plaintiffs to foreclose the
liens naming as Defendants Navalco of Utah, Green Acres of America,
Inc. and Roy E. and Carol M. Christensen.

Defendants, Green Acres

of America, Inc. and Roy E. and Carol M. Christensen, filed Motions
to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment.

As a result, the Christensens

were dismissed from the case entirely and dismissals were granted
to Green Acres of America, Inc. as to all parties except Defendants,
Lincoln, Tohara and Tohara (see Volume I of pleadings, etc., pages
343 and 344).

Defendant-Appellant, Navalco of Utah, filed a Cross

Claim against Defendant, Green Acres of America, Inc., claiming that
pursuant to the provisions of the lease, said Defendant was obligated
to hold Defendant-Appellant, Navalco of Utah, harmless for any loss
in these proceedings.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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'

Defendant-Appellant, Navalco of Utah, filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment as against all Plaintiffs and lien-claim Defendants.
The Motion was granted and Summary Judgment was entered as against
all of the lien-claim Defendants (see Volume II of pleadings, page

536).

Judge Durham ruled that none of the lien claimants, including

Plaintiffs, furnished materials or services at the instance of the
owner or of any other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor or otherwise.

Attorney's fees were also awarded in favor

of Defendant-Appellant, Navalco of Utah, as against all lien-claim
Defendants.
Prior to denying the Motion for Summary Judgment as to
the Plaintiffs, Judge Durham permitted evidence by way of testimony
offered by Jerry Cutshaw, President of Plaintiff-Respondent, Interiors:
Contracting, Inc., and by Ed Smith, President of Plaintiff-Respondent,
Action Fire Sprinkler Company (see Transcript of that hearing, Clerk's
page nos. 1090-1118).

The testimony of Plaintiff-Respondent, Interiori

Contracting, Inc., indicated a possibility of an action based upon a
conversation which occurred between Mr. Cutshaw and the staff of
Navalco of Utah prior to the completion of all work on the contract
wherein an officer of Navalco indicated to Mr. Cutshaw that the financial condition of Hungry Hawaiian was good enough to insure payment
to Interiors Contracting, Inc. for the work and materials furnished
by them.

Interiors Contracting, Inc. then completed the job.

issue of estoppel was reserved for trial.
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The

The case was tried before Judge Winder who, for matters
pertinent to this appeal, ordered as follows (Volume III, of
pleadings, etc., pages 741-745):
A.

Ruled that on the basis of the lease, sublease

and letter of January 17, 1978 consenting to the sublease, a lien
was created in favor of the Plaintiffs and against DefendantAppellant, Navalco of Utah.

This ruling was directly in conflict

with the rulings which Judge Durham had made on the Motions to
Dismiss and Motions for Summary Judgment upon which she had acted.
B.

Judge Winder made no ruling on the Cross Claim of

Defendant-Appellant, Navalco of Utah, against Defendant, Green Acres

or

America, Inc.

Motion was then made by counsel for Defendant-

Appellant, Navalco of Utah, seeking amendment of the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment to award judgment on its Cross
Claim against Defendant, Green Acres of America, Inc., and a Motion
for New Trial was also made.

These Motions were denied by Judge

Durham, who heard these matters inasmuch as Judge Winder had prior
to that time resigned from the District Bench.

Appellant Navalco of Utah's failure to assert its Cross
Claim at the time of trial arose from the following facts (Volume

III, of pleadings, etc., pages 899-902):
Counsel for the two parties had been negotiating to settle
the question of attorney's fees on the Cross Complaint, but had not
been able to reduce their agreement in writing in time for the trial.
At the close of the presentation of the testimony by Defendant-
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Appellant, Navalco of Utah, Ms. Barbara Polich, attorney for Green
Acres of America, Inc., represented to the Court that the parties
had a tentative settlement agreement and that no further testimony
was required as between them.
to this.

Counsel for Navalco of Utah assented

However, the settlement agreement was never finalized.

At

the same time, all of the evidence necessary to establish Navalco
of Utah's rights under its Cross Complaint against Defendant, Green
Acres of America, Inc., was admitted in evidence.

Furthermore,

Defendant Navalco of Utah's Trial Memorandum did state that this
was one of the issues of the case.
Defendant-Appellant, Navalco of Utah, argued that its
counsel was misled by Judge Winder's statements during trial to
Mr. Anderson that he was following the law of the case as
established by Judge Durham and that the Plaintiffs could recover
only if they produced evidence indicating some sort of an agency
or express agreement existed or could be established between
Defendant-Appellant, Navalco of Utah, and the lien claimants
themselves.

His ruling was such that it encouraged counsel for

Navalco of Utah to believe that no further steps need be taken
with reference to the Counterclaim.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
I.

IT WAS ERROR FOR JUDGE WINDER TO RULE THAT THE PLAINTIFFS
WERE ENTITLED TO LIENS AGAINST THE REAL PROPERTY INTEREST
OF DEFENDANT, NAVALCO OF UTAH, AND AWARDED JUDGMENT AGAINST
DEFENDANT, NAVALCO OF UTAH, BASED UPON SUCH LIEN INTEREST.

II.

IT WAS ERROR FOR JUDGE WINDER TO FAIL TO AWARD JUDGMENT
UPON THE CROSS COMPLAINT OF DEFENDANT, NAVALCO OF UTAH,
AGAINST DEFENDANT, GREEN ACRES OF AMERICA, INC.

III.

JUDGE WINDER SO MISLED COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT, NAVALCO OF
UTAH, IN HIS STATEMENTS IN REFERENCE TO THE LAW OF THE
CASE THAT A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED.

IV.

IT WAS ERROR FOR JUDGE DURHAM TO REFUSE TO AMEND THE
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT SO
THAT THEY WOULD GRANT JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT, NAVALCO
OF UTAH, ON ITS CROSS COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT,
GREEN ACRES OF AMERICA, INC.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT WAS ERROR FOR JUDGE WINDER TO RULE THAT THE PLAINTIFFS
WERE ENTITLED TO LIENS AGAINST THE REAL PROPERTY INTEREST
OF DEFENDANT, NAVALCO OF UTAH, AND AWARDED JUDGMENT AGAINST
DEFENDANT, NAVALCO OF UTAH, BASED UPON SUCH LIEN INTEREST.
The pertinent statute is Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Annotated,

1953, Replacement Volume 4B:
38-1-3.

Those entitled to lien - What may be attached Lien on ores mined. Contractors, subcontractors and all
persons performing any services or furnishing any materials
used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any
building or structure or improvement to any premises in any
manner; all persons who shall do work or furnish materials
for the prospecting, development, preservation or working
of any mining claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or
deposit; and licensed architects and engineers and artisans
who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other like professional
service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the
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property upon or concerning which they have rendered
service, performed labor or furnished materials, for
the value of the service rendered, labor performed or
materials furnished by each respectively, whether at
the instance of the owner or of any other person acting
by this authority as agent, contractor or otherwise.
Such liens shall attach only to such interest as the
owner may have in the property, but the interest of a
lessee of a mihing claim, mine or deposit, whether
working under bond or otherwise, shall for the purposes
of this chapter include products mined and excavated
while the same remain upon the premises included within
the lease.
The critical phrase of the above statute is, "whether at
the instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his
authority as agent, contractor or otherwise."
In Judge Winder's Memorandum Decision of December 13,

1979, at Page 2, II A, he stated as follows:
"A. The Court finds that Navalco impliedly
authorized Interiors and Action Fire to furnish to
Navalco's premises labor and materials they furnished.
This finding of implied authorization is premised
entirely on what is contained in the master lease,
Exhibit 2, the sublease, Exhibit 3, and the acceptance
of the sublease by Navalco, Exhibit 16, and is further
premised on the work contracted for by the parties to
these documents and which was done for them by Interiors
and Action Fire."
The Court then states:
"Said finding is not premised on any other circumstance"
and then goes on to make an exception for the case of estoppel against
Navalco and in favor of Interiors Contracting (which we do not dispute'
The original lease between Navalco and Green Acres provided
for some $100,000 worth of work to be done on the premises and was
accompanied by a loan in that amount to finance the same.

As the

records show all of such work was completed and paid for some three
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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years before the events upon which this case is based.

D-73, D-74, D-75, D-76, D-77, D-78, D-79 and D-80.

(See Exhibits

Exhibits D-79 and

D-80 trace the disbursement of all of the 1975 construction funds.
Also see Transcript pages 103-107, Clerk's pages 1223-1227.)
Certainly, nothing in the documents to which Judge Winder
refers, that is the master lease, Exhibit 2, the sublease, Exhibit

3, and the acceptance of the sublease by Navalco, Exhibit 16, meets
the statutory test set forth hereinabove.
The labor performed and the materials furnished were
furnished clearly at the instance of Hungry Hawaiian.

Appellant

merely consented to the sublease and made a specific reservation
"that this condition and acceptance shall not vary any provision
or condition of the lease between Green Acres of America, Inc.
and Navalco."
It should be kept in mind that in the absence of the
mechanics' lien statutes no right at all would exist as between
parties not in privity.

Therefore, a statutory lien right must be

based strictly upon the terms of the statute.

Indeed, the lower

court failed to find any evidence that Hungry Hawaiian, the sublessee, was acting as agent, contractor or otherwise for Appellant,
but based its decision on the recited documents only.
This matter has been dealt with most recently in the case
of Zions First National Bank vs. Carlson, et al., 464 P.2d 387, 23
U.2d 395 (Utah Supreme Court, 1970).
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The Court states the question at page 389:
"The critical issue of the instant action is whether
Zions impliedly authorized the architectural services and
thus impliedly granted its lessee authority to bind its
fee interest."
The Court goes on to state:
"The trial court found as a matter of fact that the
lessee had been granted implied authority to bind the
lessor's interest by the following: (a) The provisions
of the option to lease and the lease; (b) Approval of
preliminary sketches; (c) Execution of zoning variance
applications and appearances and participation in zoning
hearings; (d) Approval of architectural services • • . "
The Supreme Court of Utah rejected the trial court's findings and reversed, stating at page 389:
"The facts to support findings (b) and (d) were merely
expressions of knowledge of the lessor that the lessee was
proceeding with the development of the property and do not
constitute an implied authorization. Zion's participation
in the zoning hearings was in compliance with the specific
provisions of the lease, which cannot be distorted into
an agency agreement • • • "
The Utah Supreme Court quoting Utley vs. Wear, 333 S.W. 2d

787, (Mo.App., 1960), states:
"If, on account of the shortness of the lease, the
extent, cost and character of the improvements, or other
facts in evidence, such as the participation by the lessor
in the erection or construction thereof, it can be seen
that the improvement is really for the benefit of the
lessor, and that he is having the work done through his
lessee, then it can be said with justice that the lessee
in such case is acting for the lessor."
The facts in the instant case are far removed from such a
test.

In the case here, the lessee was approximately three years

into its primary term with an option for a five-year renewal thereafter.

The construction work was for a restaurant, which certainly
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cannot be said to have value to the Appellant at this time.
future value to Appellant is entirely spectulative.

Any

We submit that

the Zions First National Bank case is direct and positive authority
against Judge Winder's decision and dispositive of this issue.
Judge Winder did not handle this case from the beginning.
The documents construed and relied upon by Judge Winder in his
decision were all dealt with exhaustively by Judge Christine M.
Durham much earlier in the case.
In the earliest phases of the case, counsel for Defendant,
Green Acres of America, Inc., filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
Complaint and also the Cross Claims of the lien claimant Defendants.
On February 20, 1979, Judge Durham issued a Memorandum
Opinion (see Volume I of Third Judicial District Court Appeal, record
of pleadings, etc., page 343 and 344).
The Court ruled "Defendant, Green Acres of America, lessee,
did not contract for the improvements made by Plaintiffs; nor did it
do anything to induce reliance by Plaintiffs, nor was its lessee
its agent in contracting for the services and materials.
a lien may not attach to its property.

Therefore,

The motion for failure to

state a claim is granted • • • ". 1
Thereafter, Appellant, Navalco of Utah, filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment against the Plaintiffs and all Defendant lien

1The case of In Re Estate of Mecham, 537 P.2d 312 (Utah

1975) expresses the law in the jurisdiction concerning the ability
of one district judge to overrule another judge in the same case.
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claimants.

This raised the same basic issue as Judge Durham had

ruled upon in response to Green Acres' Motion to Dismiss.
On June 5, 1979, Judge Durham denied the Motion for Summary
Judgment as to the Plaintiffs, but it should be pointed out that this
was done after receiving testimony from Jerry L. Cutshaw and Edward
D. Smith which raised a question as to the possibility of some claim
based upon estoppel.

The same basis was alluded to by Judge Winder

in his ultimate decision, and he actually fixed the amount of damages
growing out of that claim.

However, as to all of the other lien

claimants, Judge Durham granted Navalco's Motion for Summary Judgment on June 18, 1979 as shown in her Order appearing in Volume
II of the pleadings and orders at page 536.
All of Judge Durham's rulings, on the basic question of
whether the mere existence of the lessor-lessee relationship created
a lien right, were consistent and identical.
no such lien right existed.

She clearly found that

Only where there was evidence of some

additional relationship or where there were some facts which might
constitute an estoppel did she find any possibility of any right at
all to recovery.
We submit that this then became the law of the case.

We

further submit that Judge Winder was obligated to follow the law of
the case as established by Judge Durham.

His ruling that the basic

agreements established a right in Plaintiffs against Defendant,
Navalco of Utah, was clearly contrary to the law of the case as
established by Judge Durham.
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Judge Durham left open the question of whether there was

a right by way of estoppel against Navalco of Utah and in favor of
the Plaintiffs.

Judge Winder, in his Memorandum Opinion, found that

such a right existed in favor of Plaintiff, Interiors Contracting,

Inc., in the amount of $582.

We do not contest this decision and

we think that it is correct only to the extent that an obligation
between Navalco of Utah and Interiors Contracting, Inc. grew out
of the conversation held about a week before Interiors completed
its contract and that this is a right totally independent from
-·

the mechanics' lien statute.

Furthermore, no right to attorney's

fees could grow out of this right.

We submit that the balance

of Judge Winder's decision against Navalco of Utah is contrary
to the law of the case as established by Judge Durham, is contrary
to the statute and the law of Utah as pronounced most recently by
the Utah Supreme Court in the Zions First National Bank vs. Carlson
case, and that ruling should be reversed.
POINT II
IT WAS ERROR FOR JUDGE WINDER TO FAIL TO AWARD
JUDGMENT UPON THE CROSS COMPLAINT OF DEFENDANT,
NAVALCO OF UTAH, AGAINST DEFENDANT, GREEN ACRES
OF AMERICA, INC.
Judge Winder had Navalco of Utah's Cross Complaint against
Green Acres of America, Inc. before him.

It was clearly stated in

the original pleadings filed by Navalco of Utah and furthermore, was
reiterated in the pre-trial statement (please see Volume III of the
compendium of pleadings and orders, page 715.)

The following

appears:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

"This Defendant has filed a Cross Complaint against
Defendant, Green Acres of America, Inc. for (A) protection
from any lien claimants against this Defendant or its title
and, (B) reimbursement for the attorney's fees expended by
this Defendant in the course of this action. It is our
position that both of these obligations were imposed upon
Defendant, Green Acres of America, Inc., by the terms of
the lease agreement between these two parties."
Inasmuch as the above-referred to lease agreement became an exhibit
in the case (Exhibit 2-P), no further testimony was offered on this
point.

Therefore, once Judge Winder awarded Judgment in favor of

the Plaintiffs and against Defendant, Navalco of Utah, we respectfully submit that it was his duty to then rule upon the Cross
Complaint.
POINT III
JUDGE WINDER SO MISLED COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT, NAVALCO
OF UTAH, IN HIS STATEMENTS IN REFERENCE TO THE LAW OF
THE CASE THAT A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED.
On March 6, 1980, Navalco filed a Motion for New Trial
which appears in the compendium of pleadings, etc., in Volume III
at page 896 et seq.

Accompanying this Motion was the Affidavit of

Glen M. Hatch appearing at page 899 et seq.

The basis of this

Motion was the assertion that Judge Winder led counsel for Navalco
to believe that he would follow the law of the case as set down by
Judge Durham.

We furnish the following statements in the record by

Judge Winder which led Mr. Hatch to believe that he was following
the law of the case as established by Judge Durham:
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1,

Transcript, page 8, beginning on line 12 through page

line 1:
"THE COURT:

So there is a default, in effect, against

rungry Hawaiian but it hasn't been litigated against Navalco and
Jreen Acres?
Go ahead and put on your proof as to whether they are
Liable.
~oint

I know generally what the law is, but there would be no

in these two huge files if that had been adjudicated and it

1asn't been.
1s

This has got to be at the instance of Navalco and,

I understand the law, there has got to have been either a

~ontract
~hink

with them or an agency or something like that.

I don't

unjust enrichment is sufficient.
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

Implied contract.

I don't think implied contract is enough and

[ think Judge Durham so ruled.

I think it is the law of the case

Ln one of her decisions.

Go ahead and put on whatever evidence you want.
~ot

You have

a judgment against Hungry Hawaiian which, I guess, is worthless.

[f you want to get a judgment against Navalco, put on some evidence

:hat Navalco either authorized these repairs or something that con;ractually or agency-wise will cause liability in them and do the
;ame with Green Ac res • "
2.

Transcript, page 117-118, beginning at line 14:

"THE COURT:

Well, Mr. Anderson, I think I understand or

tave read these abstract principles, but what it comes down to, as
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I understand it in your claim as against Navalco, is whether what
you did was at the instance of Navalco or any other person acting
with authority of Navalco.

What I would like you to tell me is to

summarize the evidence that you--or give me the highlights of what
you think supports that.
Certainly, if Navalco had absolutely nothing to do with
these improvements being put in, the mere fact that they are put
into the building, that they enhance the value of the building, is
not sufficient under Utah laws as I understand it.

It has got to

be done at the instance of the owner or some person acting by his
authority as agent, contractor or otherwise.
In the Dugger case, the contractors entered into a subcontract and material was furnished to the subcontractor, clearly.
I mean, that is covered by the lien statute.
But what is it in this case, factually, that would cause
Navalco to be responsible to your two clients?

That is what would

be the most helpful to me to know, what it is that they have done
that fits this test."

3.

Transcript, page 119, beginning at line 18:

"THE COURT:

Well, but how does that benefit Navalco though?

If I lease my house and-MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

It is their building.

I understand.

They own the building.

They have entered into a lease.

The amount they are going to get is fixed.

It doesn't benefit them

in any way if it is improved or not improved.

It benefits the tenant.
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If I lease my house to somebody and it is not improved, in
other words, it is just a shell of a house and I know they are going
to fix it up, then-MR. ANDERSON:

You are happy if they fix it up because the

house is going to revert to you when it is finished.
THE COURT:

Is it your understanding under Utah law that if

I enter into a lease of ten years on my house and I know some repairs

are going to be put into that house, substantial repairs, that if
they are put in there, that I am responsible for them under the Lien
Statute?
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

If you know that they are put in there.

That is your understanding of the law?

MR. ANDERSON:

Either express or implied contract, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

No.

MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

I own a house.
You own it.

And I lease it for ten years to somebody and

that person, they are permitted to make repairs.

And let's say

that I have to give my consent to the repairs that are made.
All right.

If repairs are made and if the tenant doesn't

pay for them, they can lien the house and get it from me as the
owner.

Is that your understanding?
MR. ANDERSON:

That is my understanding of the Mechanic's

Lien Law and the Utah Supreme Court interpretation.
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THE COURT:
Mr. Hatch.

I know you are dealing with something else,

Do you agree?
MR. HATCH:

Absolutely.

THE COURT:

That the owner is liable?

MR. HATCH:

Oh, no.

I agree with what you said.

The first

page of my argument-THE COURT:

I really am a little unclear, perhaps, and that

is what I want to find out.
But it is my understanding that under the facts that I just
gave, that it isn't enough.

Now obviously, there doesn't have to be

a contractual relationship between the person who is trying to put
the lien on and the person against whom the lien is asserted, or else
the Lien laws would add nothing to the law of Utah.
at the instance and request.

But it has to be

It doesn't have to rise to the level

of a contract, but it doesn't attach simply because you own property.
Otherwise, this wording, 'At the instance· of the owner or any other
person acting by authority,' would be meaningless in the statute.
If you eliminated that and you just had the language above that,
then I suppose ownership alone would subject you to a lien to the
extent of the interest the owner has in the property.
isn't the Utah law, Mr. Anderson.

But that

That it what this case is all

about, as I understand it.
It is just what has been done at the instance and request
of the owner."
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4.

Statements to the above effect also appear at page 29

lines 18 through 27:
"MR. ANDERSON:

But the sublease of the lease of the build-

ing from the owner standing there having a conversation with the man
who is putting labor and materials into the building-THE COURT:

That implicates the sublessee, but it doesn't

have anything to do with the owner unless the owner has caused this
person to be his agent or unless there is a contractual arrangement,
as I understand the law.
Go ahead.

Overruled.

5.

Maybe I am construing this too narrowly.

Go ahead with your questions."

Page 100, line 29:

"THE COURT:

Mr. Anderson, let me just say this.

The way

that it appears, I don't think there is any question about the
material and labor that went into that job.

I think the only thing

that is in issue, as I understand it, is really whether there is any
kind of authority or any kind of agency or anything like that from
Naval co."
Mr. Hatch's Affidavit, page 900, Item 3, states:

3.

Affiant, who has practiced law for over 32
years in the courts of the State of Utah and in the
Federal Courts and many administrative tribunals,
concluded therefrom that this established the law
of the case.
We quote from Moore's Federal Practice, Volume lB, page

453:
"The correct rule is well stated by Judge Lummus of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court in Peterson v. Hopson:
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'A judge should hesitate to undo his own work • • .
Still more should he hesitate to undo the work of
another judge • • • • But until final judgment or decree
there is no lack of power, and occasionally the power
may properly be exercised.'"
This statement of the law is certainly consistent with Mr. Hatch's
reaction to Judge Winder's comments.
Relying upon the Judge's statement, Mr. Hatch stated in
Item 6, on page 901, as follows:

"6.

At the close of the testimony, Miss Polich representing Defendant, Green Acres of America, Inc., indicated
to the Court that she had a tentative agreement with Affiant
which would obviate further testimony or argument concerning
the Cross Complaint of Defendant, Navalco of Utah, against
Defendant, Green Acres of America, Inc."·
It should be noted that the reference is to a "tentative
agreement."

As appears from the draft of that agreement which was

prepared after the hearing and submitted to Mr. Hatch after the
hearing (see Volume III of pleadings, etc., page 933 et seq.), that
it was based upon the assumption that Judge Winder would follow the
law of the case as to the question of a lien running against Navalco
of Utah.
We respectfully submit that the combination of these facts
created circumstances of surprise, which induced Mr. Hatch to make
no further statement in support of the Cross Complaint against
Green Acres of America.

It certainly did not constitute an abandon-

ment of that Cross Complaint and, therefore, a new trial should be
granted on the Cross Complaint.
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POINT IV
IT WAS ERROR FOR JUDGE DURHAM TO REFUSE TO AMEND THE
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT SO
THAT THEY WOULD GRANT JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT, NAVALCO
OF UTAH, ON ITS CROSS COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT,
GREEN ACRES OF AMERICA, INC.
Navalco filed a Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and award judgment to Navalco of Utah
against Green Acres of America, Inc. upon Navalco's Cross Complaint.
This appears beginning at page 838 of Volume III of the compendium
of pleadings.

We take the position that Judge Durham who heard this
matter after Judge Winder had left the Third District Bench could
simply have granted the order based upon the facts of the case.
Section 78-7-21, U.C.A., Replacement Volume 9A provides:
Proceedings unaffected by vacancy in office of judge. No proceeding in any court of justice, in any action or
special proceeding pending therein, is affected by a
vacancy in the office of all or any of the judges, or
by the failure of a term thereof.
Rule 63 Rules of Civil Procedure, U.C.A., Replacement Volume 9B,
page 289, provides:
If by reason of death, sickness, or other disability,
a judge before whom an action has been tried is unable to perform the duties to be performed by the
court under these Rules after a verdict is returned
or findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed,
then any other judge regularly sitting in or assigned
to the court in which the action was tried may perform
these duties; but if such other judge is satisfied
that he cannot perform those duties because he did
not preside at the trial or for any other reason, he
may in his discretion grant a new trial.
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However, Judge Durham ruled that it was necessary for counsel for
Navalco to "submit the issue to the Court."

She took the position

that by failing to "submit" the issue, Navalco abandoned it.
respectfully urge this Court to rule otherwise.

We

This matter was

in the pleadings, was raised in the pre-trial statement and all
of the proof necessary for consideration of the issue was before
the Court.

Entirely aside from the unique circumstances which

induced counsel for Navalco to fail to say anything further on
the matter, we think the Court should rule that the matter was
before the Trial Court and since Judge Winder failed to dispose
of it, then Judge Durham should have acted upon the question.
We also respectfully suggest that the very matters raised
in our Motion for New Trial were ample basis for Judge Durham to
amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment as requested.

She was apprised by Mr. Hatch's Affidavit of the fact

that the tentative agreement had not been reduced to writing and
presented to Mr. Hatch prior to the completion of the argument in
the case and that further, it included provisions upon which the
parties had never reached agreement.

This coupled with the fact

that Judge Winder led counsel to believe that the question simply
would not be raised is, we submit, sufficient basis for her to
order the amendment in question.
CONCLUSION
The ruling of Judge Durham that none of the lien claimants
furnished materials or services at the instance of Appellant or any
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other person acting by Appellant's authority as agent, contractor or
otherwise and, therefore, not entitled to a lien against Appellant's
interest became the "law of the case" and should have been adhered to
by Judge Winder.

Moreover, the documents relied upon by Judge Winder

to establish Plaintiffs' lien by "implied authorization" cannot be
construed as such under the test heretofore established in the Zions
decision (supra).

We, therefore, submit that the judgment of Judge

Winder should be reversed.
The law of the case was correctly established by Judge
Durham in her rulings affecting most of the parties.

Insofar as the

question presented to Judge Durham was whether the Plaintiffs were
entitled to a lien against the fee interest of Defendant, Navalco of
Utah, nothing new was established at the trial which should have
warranted Judge Winder, in effect, to reverse Judge Durham.

We

submit that no case was made out establishing such a lien right and
it should have been denied.
Defendant-Appellant, Navalco of Utah, clearly stated a
Cross Complaint against Defendant-Respondent, Green Acres of America,
Inc., in its pleadings and reasserted the matter in the pre-trial
memorandum.

Furthermore, ample evidence for granting judgment on

the basis of the lease, Exhibit 2, was before the Court and judgment
on the Cross Claim should have been awarded.
If the Court reverses the Trial Court's decision that a
lien existed against Navalco of Utah, the Court should remand the
~ase

to the trial court for a determination of the amount of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II

-23-

attorney's fees, which should be awarded Appellant, Navalco of Utah,
under the Cross Complaint.
Finally, in the event that the Court fails to reverse the
judgment of Judge Winder granting a lien against Navalco of Utah,
the Court should remaind the case to the lower court for trial of
Appellant's Cross Claim.
DATED this

').._

°! ~ay

of July, 1980.
Respectfully submitted,

BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH

G. ASLAM
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

By·~~~

GfJM:HATCH
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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